Form 4: Amanpal Singh Bhutani Receives Stock Grant from The New York Times Company

Director Amanpal Singh Bhutani was granted 3,589 shares of Class A Common Stock from The New York Times Company under the 2020 Incentive Compensation Plan.

Summary

• Amanpal Singh Bhutani, a director of The New York Times Company, received a grant of 3,589 shares of Class A Common Stock on April 30, 2025.
• The grant was made under The New York Times Company 2020 Incentive Compensation Plan.
• These shares are in the form of stock-settled restricted stock units, each representing a contingent right to receive one share of Class A Common Stock.
• The restricted stock units vest on the date of the following Annual Meeting of Stockholders.
• Vested shares will be delivered within 90 days following the cessation of Bhutani's membership on the Board of Directors.
• Following the transaction, Bhutani directly owns 29,434 shares of Class A Common Stock.

Sentiment

Score: 5

Explanation: The document is a standard regulatory filing related to insider transactions, and does not inherently convey positive or negative sentiment. It's a neutral disclosure.

Positives

• The grant of restricted stock units aligns the director's interests with those of the shareholders.
• The vesting schedule encourages continued service on the Board of Directors.

Future Outlook

The document does not contain any specific forward-looking statements regarding the company's future performance.

Industry Context

This filing is a routine disclosure of insider transactions, which is common for publicly traded companies. It provides transparency into the compensation and ownership structure of the company's directors.

Comparison to Industry Standards

• Stock grants to directors are a common practice among publicly traded companies to incentivize and align their interests with shareholders.
• The vesting schedule and terms of the restricted stock units appear to be standard practice.
• Comparing the size of the grant to those of directors at similar media companies (e.g., News Corp, Gannett) would provide further context.

Stakeholder Impact

• The stock grant has a minor dilutive effect on existing shareholders.
• It incentivizes the director to act in the best interests of the company and its shareholders.

Key Dates

Keywords

stock grant, restricted stock units, director, insider trading, Form 4, NYT, New York Times Company, Bhutani, Amanpal Singh